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Water management and the procedural turn: norms and transitions in Alberta 




In 2003, the Canadian province of Alberta adopted Water for Life: Alberta’s Strategy for 
Sustainability (Alberta Environment 2003a). Impetus for the strategy came from several 
directions. In 2001, a severe drought had pushed total licensed withdrawals in southern Alberta 
past total available water for the first time ever (Alberta Environment 2005). Subsequent studies 
revealed the 20
th
 century as abnormally wet and exposed the incongruence of Alberta’s hydro-
climatic history and its supply-side water development path (Sauchyn et al. 2003; Laird et al. 
2003; Schindler and Donahue 2006; Shepherd et al. 2010). These challenges were set within the 
context of Alberta’s water laws, which had been designed to facilitate southern irrigation but not 
for Alberta’s large northern energy industry – the Oil Sands – where resource extraction from 
some of the world’s largest reserves of unconventional fossil fuel impact water quality and 
quantity (Kelly et al. 2009, 2010; Rooney et al. 2012; Kurek et al. 2013). Also significant across 
Alberta were the on-going struggles of indigenous First Nations for recognition of water rights 
(Bartlett 1986; Phare 2009).  
 
In this context, Water for Life inaugurated Alberta’s shift from ‘government to 
governance’ through new institutional relationships and the cultivation of new norms, or rules of 
right conduct. Interestingly, the strategy considers aspects of law, management and policy that 
the literature on Transition Management (TM) identifies as key understanding changes in 
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complex socio-technical systems. As such, this paper examines Water for Life in light of 
concerns in TM regarding the role of political and ethical norms (Loorbach 2010; Meadowcroft 
2011). The first section of the paper explores what I term the “procedural turn” in water 
management and the ways that new normative expectations come to characterize issues of 
fairness and legitimacy. The second examines Alberta’s Water for Life strategy from 2001-2008, 
the period in which the strategy was developed, implemented and renewed. Through semi-
structured interviews it examines governance transitions under Water for Life and the tensions 
that arise as new procedural norms are made operational.  
 
2. Water management’s procedural turn  
 
 For several decades there has been a rejection of ‘command and control’ resource 
management paradigms due to their mismatch with complex and changing social-ecological 
systems (i.e. Holling and Meffe 1996). In response, there has been a “procedural turn” where 
resource management does not seek to secure some predetermined end or good, but to find 
techniques that fit management aims with decision making formats that reflexively incorporate 
feedback from multiple stakeholders and from social-ecological systems (Gunderson et al. 2002; 
Durant et al. 2004). The water sector has similarly favored the design of management institutions 
that allow for multiple viewpoints, multiple objectives and the capacity to reflexively respond to 
surprise and uncertainty (Sabatier et al. 2005; Feldman 2007). This procedural turn has a 
normative dimension due to expectations that democratic institutions should be neutral with 
respect to the different values and beliefs of constituents (see Sandel 1996). That is, the 
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expectation is that decision making will take place through procedures that do not intrinsically 
favor the beliefs – the substantive goods – of any particular group.  
 
A key consideration of the procedural turn is fitting institutional norms to social-
ecological systems under conditions where knowledge is positioned and partial (Bromley 2012). 
A particular challenge for water management is that problems are often ambiguous, with 
multiple legitimate ways to bridge from positioned and partial understandings to policy rationale 
(Brugnach et al. 2011). One strategy has been to shift from the exercise of democratic rights (i.e. 
voting) towards the inclusion of representative discourses that bring multiple perspectives to bear 
on a particular issue (Dryzek 2000). Within this context, there has likewise been increased 
attention given to policy discourse (Hajer 1995; Rydin 2003). In the literature on participatory 
water management, organizing the positioned and partial perspectives of multiple stakeholders is 
often accomplished in reference to Habermas’ theory of communicative rationality (i.e. Pahl-
Wostl 2002; Priscoli 2004).  
 
The appeal to Habermas (1984a,b) provides a philosophical basis for the ‘procedural 
turn’ by offering a way to preserve a rational basis for water management while recognizing that 
no single perspective represents all constituents. This is accomplished by focusing on the 
procedural rules that allow meaningful deliberation to take place. For Habermas (1996), the rules 
governing communication, together with the ways we come to accept or reject the claims made 
by others, provide the basis for legitimacy. Sustained treatments of Habermas have been offered 
as the basis for social learning and adaptive management (i.e. Norton 2005). These emphasize 
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that legitimacy arises through those affected by decisions reaching consensus, and the design of 
procedures that allow consensus to be reached without coercion. 
 
 Once the procedural turn is conceptualized, a significant challenge in water management 
is how to approach issues of fairness or coercion in contexts where certain actors hold more 
political power. Those with legally entrenched water rights, for instance, hold more power than 
those who do not. Studies by social psychologists suggest that achieving agreement regarding 
what constitutes “fairness” is possible (Syme and Nancarrow 1996; Syme et al. 1999). But what 
remains elusive is the transition itself – a way of incorporating new norms and decision criteria, 
such as those for instream flow requirements (Postel and Richter 2003; Wescoat and White 
2003). In this context, the literature on Transition Management (TM) offers an approach to 
organizing complex social, legal and management systems in ways that allow for the diverse set 
of values and possibilities held by those affected by resource decisions to become effective 
contributors in management decisions (Olsson et al. 2006). 
 
TM uses a threefold characterization of multi-level institutions where strategic, tactical 
and operational scales of decision making have respective (though not isolated) tasks of setting 
the vision, agenda and experimental goals (Kemp et al. 2007). Sensitivity to cross-scalar 
dynamics is designed to link TM with a general account of complex systems and to facilitate 
sustainability by fitting socio-technical systems of governance to complex social-ecological 
systems (van der Brugge and van Raak 2007; Rotmans and Loorbach 2009). Achieving 
normative legitimacy is key to TM because how stakeholders frame the problems, processes and 
solutions affecting socio-technical systems affects the role of knowledge within them 
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(Meadowcroft, 2007; Loorbach 2010; Smith and Stirling 2010; Voß and Bornemann 2011). In 
water management, the highly interconnected nature of water across different levels of 
government, social customs and legal histories further complicates transitions due to the number 
and nature of participants affected by changes (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2010; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2011). 
Olsson et al. (2006) point out that complicated scenarios are often aided by “shadow networks,” 
such as civil society partnerships, that have evolved outside of formal arrangements in ways that 
can provide valuable institutional models, and alternate sources of legitimacy, during transitions. 
 
Despite its promise, Hendricks (2009: 342) argues TM has not been adequately 
developed with respect to the political aspects of transitions because it has not been “explicitly 
concerned with ‘the political’ dimensions of transition processes, and the ‘politics’ they 
generate.” This distinction between ‘the political’ and ‘politics’ draws on Mouffe (2005), who 
argues that the antagonistic power conflicts found in human societies should be understood as 
constituting ‘the political’ while ‘politics’ should be understood as the practices and institutions 
through which agreements regarding social order are made within the broader context of conflict. 
Anecdotally, we can imagine how antagonistic water management conflicts come to characterize 
the ‘politics’ of new institutions. For instance, the evolution of prior the appropriation doctrine in 
the western United States is a case where rights codified community norms to manage conflicts 
regarding capitalist speculators accumulating water rights (Schorr 2005). 
 
In drawing a distinction between ‘the political’ and ‘politics’, Mouffe (2000; 2005) 
argues that Habermas is mistaken in his assertion that neutral procedures can be found for 
deliberative democracy. Hendrick’s (2009) likewise argues that the multiple spheres of 
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legitimacy affecting socio-technical systems do not always conform in practice to the sorts of 
theoretical claims offered by proponents of deliberative democracy. This is because the practice 
of democracy already depends on political and ethical norms for coordinating decision making 
and existing power relations that may be contested by certain groups, such as indigenous groups 
(Espelund 1998; Boelens et al. 2010). In this light, it is therefore critical that different modes of 
knowledge production or social coordination not be ‘integrated’ into procedures or paradigms 
that are unable to accommodate social or political difference (Brugnach and Ingram 2012). 
 
One way to clarify these normative concerns is to explicitly address values. This is the 
suggestion of a growing literature on water ethics where the aim is to identify the values that 
already exist in a particular socio-technical system and to reference governance transitions to 
sources of normative legitimacy, such as those found in religion or law (Butler 2000; West 2007; 
Chamberlain 2008; Peppard 2014). Schmidt (2010) suggests, following Habermas, that ethical 
issues in water management arise regarding: (1) claims about personal beliefs or values, (2) 
claims about facts or states of affairs, and (3) claims regarding correctly ordered social 
relationships. Priscolli (2000) treats these broad and overlapping concerns by arguing that water 
ethics should be historically informed in order to gain a sense of realism regarding the norms that 
have evolved over time as societies and ecological systems mutually interact. This suggests two 
tasks. One is to identify values supported or oppressed under previous management regimes 
(Feldman 1995; Whiteley et al. 2008). This helps to situate the conflicts that precipitated 
management changes (i.e. to explain ‘the political’ antagonisms). A second considers the 
existing philosophic approach to conflicts for how it addresses issues of fairness or justice (or 
does not) within existing socio-technical systems (Tisdell 2003; Feldman 2007). This step 
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provides a basis for thinking about how previous conflicts shaped the ‘politics’ of new 
management regimes.  
 
Considering the procedural turn, an explicit focus on political and ethical norms may help 
reveal how transitions appeal to existing values while seeking to address the conflicts that 
prompted management reforms. In this sense, attending to water ethics offers a way to bridge 
between inherited norms and new institutions by considering how norms act during periods of 
transition. In so doing, water ethics can identify ways in which new procedures are not designed 
in a neutral context while also helping to explain on-the-ground attempts at deliberative 
democracy. Alberta’s Water for Life strategy has been described as fostering a new water ethic 
(Alberta Water Council 2007) and as an instance of “watershed democracy” (Bakker 2010). As 
such, this paper examines what the Alberta case reveals about how policy norms affect 
transitions in complex socio-technical systems. 
 
3. Watershed management transitions in Alberta 
 
Transitions to watershed management in Canada have not proceeded under a single 
model (Senecal and Madramootoo 2005). A trend exists, however, towards using the ‘watershed’ 
as an administrative unit and as a tool for re-scaling management (Cohen 2012). Alongside the 
rise of watershed management, several Canadian jurisdictions including Alberta, Quebec, Nova 
Scotia and the Northwest Territories have crafted water strategies. Alberta’s water strategy was 
developed and implemented with explicit attention to values and to the re-scaling of 
8 
management. As such, it offers an opportunity to consider how norms operate in the transitions 
prompted by conflicts and how they affect the politics of new institutions.  
 
This part of the paper examines the Alberta case in two steps. The first uses a modified 
content analysis to examine the development, implementation and renewal of Alberta’s Water 
for Life strategy from 2001-2008. The analysis follows Bakker’s (2004) suggestion that 
hypothesis-building presents a strategy for linking water reforms to the attitudes, data and 
political institutions that explain complex, contextually nuanced policy uptake. As such, the 
content analysis followed Krippendorff’s (2004) suggestion that because the researcher always 
makes contextual judgments conclusions should understood abductively – as inferences to the 
best explanation (see also Gabbay and Woods 2005). The second reports on interviews (n=25) 
conducted from 2009-2012 at two levels of Alberta’s new multi-level water governance system: 
the provincial Alberta Water Council and regional Watershed Planning and Advisory Councils 
(WPACs).  
 
The rationale for conducting interviews over several years is that WPACs were 
established at different times across Alberta and an attempt was made to conduct interviews 
during the construction of “state of the watershed” reports, which represent the first opportunity 
to assess ‘politics’ after Alberta’s procedural turn. Following Baxter and Eyles (1997), rigour 
was established by purposively sampling for knowledgeable members of Alberta’s water 
governance system and iterative reflection on the judgments of the researcher. The positioned, 
non-neutral perspectives of both interviewees and the interviewer present a perennial challenge 
in interview analysis (Rose 1997; Law 2004; Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). And to help situate 
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each, both the claims of interviewees and the interpretation of results were triangulated wherever 
possible against grey literature, the minutes of legislative debates and scientific studies (for full 
methodological details see Schmidt 2012). A semi-structured interview format was used to 
assess common themes across all WPACs, such as models of achieving consensus. On these, 
saturation was reached as the procedural dimensions of WPACs were often, as shown below, 
part of an existing institutional network. On other themes, however, there were divergent 
findings on how procedures should be applied to specific contexts and constituencies. From 
these, no attempt is made to generalize. Quotations were chosen to illustrate the challenges of 
transitioning socio-technical systems.  
 
3.1 Alberta’s water policy context 
 
Alberta’s recent water management reforms followed immediately upon a conflict in the 
1980s regarding the construction of the Oldman Dam. The conflict galvanized a coalition of 
activists, scientists and landowners and drew into its ambit long-standing tensions between 
Alberta, Canada’s federal government and indigenous First Nations (Glenn 1999). Several 
historical reasons explain why the conflict took shape as it did. One was legal. In this regard, 
water allocations were licensed through a ‘first in time – first in right’ system of prior 
appropriation first set in place in 1894 under the North-west Irrigation Act and which persisted 
under Alberta’s 1931 Water Resources Act (Percy, 1977). The original aim of the NIA was to 
maximize water’s utility with a single substantive good in mind: enhancing national welfare, or 
what the NIA’s key architect William Pearce (1891) described as the best interest of the 
community. This “community” did not extend to First Nations, who are not mentioned in the 
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NIA and have never had water rights formally recognized in Alberta (Matsui 2009; Phare 2009). 
Complicating this further is that, while Alberta holds constitutional control over water, the 
responsibility to negotiate with First Nations lies within federal jurisdiction (Bartlett 1986). 
 
A second dimension of the Oldman Dam conflict was tied to the sort of management 
regime that had evolved to enhance the national interest. Originally, Alberta’s water allocation 
licenses were granted appurtenant to the lands and uses identified in the original application and 
this curtailed the ease with which they could be transferred to new areas of demand (Percy 
1986). Over the 20
th
 century, regulatory piecework did create some ad hoc room for increasing 
water availability (Percy 1996) but, in the main, demand was met through supply-side increases 
to water availability (see Armstrong et al., 2009). Supply-side management required federal 
funding for water infrastructure projects and this created tension as the Alberta sought increased 
provincial control over decision making (Marchildon 2009). One other piece of regulatory work 
was the creation of “Instream Objectives” that put limits on water allocation to ensure the 
demands of licensed water users would be met. Instream Objectives were not, however, 
referenced to environmental criteria (Alberta Environment 2005). As a result, when Alberta 
gained full control over infrastructure in the 1970s and, coincidentally, when irrigation rapidly 
expanded it did so in tension with growing environmental awareness and the emergence of 
environmental law in Canada and Alberta (see AIPA 2002; Wood et al. 2010). 
 
In this context, the Oldman Dam can be seen as the last in a series of supply-side water 
management solutions in Alberta. Without detailing the intricacies of the conflict itself with 
respect to Supreme Court decisions regarding the lack of environmental assessments, the politics 
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of federal-provincial relations or negotiations regarding First Nations rights (see Glenn 1999), 
one of the main outcomes of the conflict was that Alberta immediately embarked on water 
management consultations in the early 1990s. After public consultations and in response to the 
pressure of coalitions formed during the Oldman Dam controversy, the government passed the 
1996 Water Act, which came in to force in 1999 and created the possibility for regional 
watershed management plans and a provincial water strategy (Heinmiller 2013). Shortly 
thereafter, consultations began for what became Water for Life: Alberta’s strategy for 
sustainability. 
 
3.2 Water for Life: 2001-2008 
 
Alberta’s Water for Life strategy promoted a procedural turn in line with several aspects 
of Transition Management. The first stage of Water for Life was the formation of an ‘Ideas 
Group’ of key stakeholders that met in 2001 and positioned Alberta’s nascent strategy in 
reference to “systems thinking,” stating that governance “[r]esults are affected by feedback in the 
system (i.e. people learn about other options and try to use them; people adapt more efficiently if 
they learn about changes in the system as people respond to the options available)” (McMillan 
2001: 2). According to the Ideas Group, a systems approach would link four governance pillars 
in a non-hierarchical strategy: the environment, human water uses, knowledge and a sustainable 
economy. Procedurally, “[t]he Ideas Group imagined a possible world in which water 
management is largely undertaken through an open management system...” where the 
government transitions from management to “setting the rules” (McMillan 2001: 5). 
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 Public consultation on Water for Life was held in spring of 2002, after which the 
government hosted a Ministerial Forum that convened a larger group of stakeholders and experts. 
Participants at the forum were divided into working groups to address: “water conservation, 
water quality, drinking water, aquatic ecosystems, water supply, water and its role in the 
economy, or governance” (McMillan 2002b: 1). The water conservation team first referenced the 
idea of creating a ‘water ethic’ by noting that, “the provincial government must challenge 
Albertans and user sectors to establish and implement a water conservation ethic…as one 
element of a sustainable water strategy” (McMillan 2002b: 11). Across working groups, 
participants emphasized watersheds as the appropriate management scale (McMillan 2002b). 
Additionally, a four-fold governance structure was proposed, including: a Provincial Authority 
integrated with the government, policy advisory boards at the provincial and watershed levels 
and, finally, Water Basin Authorities “empowered to make decisions and oversee 
implementation of water management” (McMillan 2002b: 21).  
 
In March 2003, Alberta Environment (2003b) circulated its draft Water for Life strategy. 
The governance structure, however, was not that suggested by the Ministerial Forum. The source 
of the new structure is not stated but in it all regulatory authority remains with the government 
and a three-tier system was created, comprised of: a provincial advisory board (the Alberta 
Water Council), regional watershed planning and advisory councils (WPACs), and community-
based water stewardship groups. This governance structure mirrors the division of labor 
identified in Transition Management, with the Alberta Water Council focusing on strategies and 




The final version of Water for Life was published in November 2003. The strategy 
maintained a non-regulatory nature and trimmed the four governance pillars of the Ideas Group 
to three by excluding “knowledge” – which was originally defined as what is “…needed to make 
wise choices about water” (McMillan 2001: 2). The three remaining pillars – aquatic ecosystem 
health, safe and secure drinking water, and a sustainable economy – are introduced in Water for 
Life as critical for Alberta’s transition away from a supply-side era to one in which “population 
growth, droughts and agricultural and industrial development are increasing demand and 
pressure on the province’s water supplies, and the risk to the health and well-being of Albertans, 
our economy and our aquatic ecosystems” (Alberta Environment 2003a: 5).  
 
Since Water for Life was adopted, the Alberta Water Council has been charged with its 
assessment and renewal. The council was initially envisioned as an expert panel, but as its 24-
member constituency has evolved, it is now seen as a window into provincial-level stakeholder 
concerns (personal interview 1). The Council’s renewal documents attempt to bridge stakeholder 
differences through appeals to norms and the idea of fostering a new ‘water ethic’. For instance,  
 
• “The Alberta Water Council believes the Water for Life strategy creates the possibility for a 
new water ethic in Alberta—one based on conservation, sound science and shared 
responsibility for watershed management planning” (Alberta Water Council 2007: 1).  
 
More recently, the Alberta Water Council (2008a: 15) stated that a key direction for Alberta was 
that: “All sectors understand how their behaviours impact water quality, quantity and the health 
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of aquatic ecosystems, adopt a ‘water conservation ethic’ and take action.” In a content analysis 
of the documents leading up to Water for Life and following upon it, three normative elements 
were identified as central to fostering this ethic: (1) conservation, (2) sound science, and (3) 
shared governance. These fit well with the notion that procedural norms linking water 
management and ethics involve: (1) claims based on experience, (2) claims regarding facts, or 
states of affairs, and (3) claims regarding correctly ordered social relationships (Schmidt 2010). 
Each is considered in turn below. 
 
In terms of conservation, phrases like ‘wise use’ or ‘wise choices’ are used in all the 
analyzed policy documents from 2001-2008. This way of characterizing conservation hearkens 
back to the ‘wise use’ movement of the early 20th century and is employed to balance current and 
future demands with the experiential wisdom of Alberta’s water management stakeholders. In 
this way, even though Water for Life removed ‘knowledge’ as a governance pillar for ‘wise 
decision making’, there is an emphasis on the experience and understanding of those affected by 
decisions. For instance, Water for Life charges governance partners with the responsibility for 
“the wise management of Alberta’s water quantity and quality for the benefit of Albertans now 
and in the future” as well as stating that “citizens, communities, industries and governments all 
share responsibility for the wise use and sustainability of their watersheds” (Alberta Environment 
2003a). 
 
In terms of sound science, Alberta’s new water ethic is characterized by a changing 
perspective towards how to incorporate facts, or states of affairs, into ‘state of the basin’ reports. 
These reports are the first task WPACs undertake and are designed to provide a ‘snapshot’ of 
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watershed health and to reflect concerns regarding water quality, quantity and social demands. 
Interestingly, the content analysis revealed that the difficulty of assembling or adjudicating 
amongst different types of data was not explicitly recognized during the design or approval of 
Water for Life. Soon after, however, the difficulty of assessing and monitoring diverse types of 
data is identified (Alberta Water Council 2007). This recognition of complexity recurs in all 
subsequent policy documents. 
 
In terms of governance partnerships, the Alberta Water Council (2008b) began an 
analysis of the “policy gap” that arose as the “number and sophistication of Water for Life 
partnerships has increased, and an already-complex system of multiple stakeholders operating in 
a multi-jurisdictional environment has become more complicated.”  This growing recognition of 
complexity can be seen in tandem with how multiple stakeholders at various scales began to 
interpret the procedural norms of Water for Life. And it became particularly problematic, 
according to the Council (2008a), because these new “…organizations, their relationships to one 
another, and how they would function existed only on paper.” As shown below, however, this a-
political context for partnerships did not reflect the reality on the ground. 
 
Before considering how management transitions were effected in Alberta, we might ask 
why there was such an emphasis on a new water ethic. One explanation is Alberta’s informal 
governance structure required sources of legitimacy outside of regulatory authority. In this sense, 
an emphasis on norms explicitly links Alberta’s water management heritage with the challenge 
of finding procedures that can incorporate a diverse constituency of stakeholders. If we applied 
Mouffe’s (2005) partitioning of ‘the political’ from ‘politics’ we might characterize Alberta’s 
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focus on conservation, sound science and partnerships as one where the ‘politics’ of discourse 
reflect an attempt to manage water in the broader context of conflicts after the Oldman Dam (i.e. 
‘the political’). Whether this procedural turn effectively addresses conflicts is explored next.  
 
3.3 Multi-level watershed governance in Alberta 
 
 As Olsson et al. (2006) argue, ‘shadow networks’ operating outside of formal 
arrangements can be key to the successful management of transitions. This was the case in 
Alberta, where civil society groups had, prior to Water for Life, formed watershed alliances and 
river-keeping groups to advocate for improved water stewardship. Many of these began in the 
1990s in response to the Oldman Dam controversy (personal interview 2). Interestingly, these 
existing networks were targeted as the primary groups for forming regional WPACs. In fact, the 
Bow River Council in southern Alberta became the model for WPACs under Water for Life 
(personal interview 2). Contrary to the Alberta Water Council’s (2008a) claim then, how 
partnerships might function did not exist “only on paper.” Rather, civil society groups brought 
alternate networks, partnerships and practices with them. This section reports on interviews with 
individuals involved with WPACs and the Alberta Water Council. Due to the small nature of 
Alberta’s water community and conditions of confidentiality, respondents are not identified. The 





 The ability to balance Alberta’s water history and future challenges characterizes wise-
use conservation. On the ground, interviewees contextualized this challenge through an 
appreciation of existing water use practices, acknowledgment of existing rights, the need for 
public education, and the shifts required to manage at a watershed scale. Several interviewees 
reflected on these demands through a combination of ambivalence towards the constraints of 
existing norms tempered by a sense of goodwill. Across all WPACs and the Alberta Water 
Council the model of decision making was by consensus. Interviewees noted that consensus was 
typically achieved, but also that many contentious issues remained to be decided upon after the 
“state of the basin” report was complete and an integrated management plan was being devised. 
In terms of representation, many participants at both the WPAC level and with the Alberta Water 
Council are paid to participate as stakeholders by various government agencies or private firms 
and these have a greater capacity for participation than less well-funded or geographically distant 
stakeholders.  
 
As suggested in the introduction, one of Alberta’s water challenges is growing awareness 
that water availability in the 20
th
 century was atypical. With regard to conservation and 
conditions of climate uncertainty, respondents had two main concerns. First, assessing climate 
risks to future water supplies produced too much uncertainty. Several interviewees expressed 
concern that more needed to be done in terms of increasing adaptive capacity in view of likely 
climate changes, but that broad scale uncertainty led to reduced policy advice and increased 
difficulty of finding consensus. As one participant stated, 
 
18 
“We get questions about climate change and so on. And we, more or less, don’t really 
know what to do there…If somebody can tell you that the river flow was going to be 
down by 20% in 20 years, 40% in 40 years, then you could do something for it.” 
(Personal interview 3). 
 
The difficulties of addressing large-scale uncertainties had an interesting effect of consolidating 
efforts to find consensus to actionable items, such as the need to address issues of over-allocated 
waters, public education and so forth. But interviewees did not appeal to localism and most 
respondents recognized their position in much larger complex systems. Rather, the opportunity 
for action on climate would depend, as it always had, on finding ways of sharing water in 
communities and finding ways to work with or around formal government policy.  
 
3.3.2 Sound Science  
 
 The first task of all WPACs is to conduct a ‘state of the basin’ report. In regions where 
civil society groups previously existed, this process was undertaken more quickly because 
organizational capacity was already in place. Typically, the task of drafting the report across both 
organizationally mature and newly created WPACs was contracted out to consultants, with 
interviewees noting that routinely using consultants produced biases: “[w]hen you’re a hammer, 
every problem looks like a nail. So when you’re an oil and gas, a strong oil and gas consultant, 
you tend to go to what you know” (personal interview 4). Nevertheless, “most members defer to 
the technical experts as to what was needed to really show the health of the watershed” (personal 
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interview 5). More broadly, interviewees across the province remarked on challenges of 
grounding ‘state of the basin’ reports in sound science: 
 
“I mean, some data exists, but what you really need are 20 parallel river systems, in 
which you manipulate them in various ways by manipulating flow and seeing what the 
environmental impacts are. Well, that simply can’t be done. So we need to get at 
important things in other ways.” (personal interview 6) 
 
“With the suite of indicators that we actually require to actually do an assessment of the 
condition [of the watershed], we need 33 indicators looked at across all sub-watersheds. 
And at this point we have data for 11 of them, and of those 11 only 4 can we actually do 
comparative work across all sub-watersheds.” (personal interview 7) 
 
As one interviewee remarked, ‘state of the basin’ reports are really reports on the current 
state of knowledge, not an empirical ‘snapshot’ of the watershed per se. And it is noteworthy that 
no WPACs had the capacity to commission new studies for assembling state of the watershed 
reports. This produced variance regarding the integration of data coming from multiple sources, 
sometimes from several years (or decades) prior and often not targeted to systemic concerns but 
rather to specific questions, such as those regarding sport fisheries. As a result, some 
stakeholders noted that data for important contemporary questions, such as the impact of new 
technologies on aquatic health, were missing. In this regard, the claims about states of affairs 
were not free from normative content regarding what data should be used. This issue was also 





 The role of partnerships was the most contentious. As mentioned above, civil society 
groups had previously formed networks and these included partnerships with municipalities, fish 
and game organizations, NGOs, forestry, industry and agricultural groups. As such, when these 
networks became part of Alberta’s WPAC system it was not a single organization that was 
transitioning, but an entire network of relationships. In some cases, existing partners backed out 
entirely or significantly reduced their contributions due to the new role of the government. This 
created a critical issue regarding how WPACs were funded. At first, government funds were 
provided in the form of grants and essentially replaced any lost network support with few 
conditions. But, more recently, they have shifted to a contract basis. As interviewees put it, 
 
“…we are resistant to that because contracts have confidentiality agreements, and so on 
and so forth. And we don’t want our hands tied like that. If we detect a problem in the 
watershed, we want to talk about that problem in the watershed, and we don’t want any 
kind of political pressure on us to say, ‘Oh, we just want to hush that up right now,’ or 
‘We’re not ready to talk about that.’ Unfortunately, those political things can happen, and 
we don’t want any part of that type of thing.” (Personal interview 6) 
 
“I think that the percentage of funding we get from the province really, really drives what 
we do…we should be thinking about being independent because in some sense if we’re 
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just a contract deliverer for the province, that’s not a tremendous reason for existing” 
(Personal Interview 8). 
 
 Concerns over the funding model were also of concern for the creation of new 
partnerships. In particular, a challenge across Alberta is the participation of indigenous First 
Nations. And while a full account of the reasons and history behind this is beyond the scope of 
this paper, numerous respondents suggested that the lack of participation could be due to: the 
legal status of First Nations, issues of capacity or those of trust. Others, however, identified the 
contractual basis of funding as a barrier because of the condition that all knowledge would 
become the intellectual property of the government. For several First Nations, this preempted 
participation because it would make Traditional Ecological Knowledge government property 
(personal interview 7). 
 
Contract clauses were not the only concerns at play. Another involved the coordination of 
the multi-level governance system itself. In this sense, the informal governance regime was 
created without clear linkages (even on paper) between different scales of decision making at the 
provincial, watershed, or community level. Several participants noted that, apart from one 
stakeholder seat on the Alberta Water Council, there are no formal mechanisms for knowledge 
exchange or for linking policy advice to across scales WPACs. This meant Alberta’s new 
management system was not initially coordinated, although a number of WPAC summits have 
been organized to share learning experiences. This lack of coordination also existed between 
WPACs and local Watershed Stewardship Groups because no formal arrangements or guidelines 
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were in place for integrating the “information they [Watershed Stewardship Groups] generate or 
where it goes to or who owns it or whatever” (Personal Interview 3). 
 
3.4 Case-study Conclusion 
 
Changes to water management in Alberta emerged within a context of conflict – ‘the 
political’ – and created new institutional orders – ‘politics’ – that turned towards procedural 
techniques for generating normative legitimacy. In this way, Alberta’s Water for Life strategy 
appealed to aspects of both deliberative democracy and transition management, including 
decentralized, stakeholder driven models of watershed planning and the creation of multi-level 
governance structures. This suite of reforms was explicitly positioned in normative terms. At 
both the policy and practical level, the fostering of a new ‘water ethic’ can be seen as an 
interesting policy bridge between the idealized conditions of reaching consensus found in 
deliberative democracy and the role of existing power relations and conflicts that affect water 
management decisions. Before considering these theoretical implications, two conclusions might 
be drawn from the Alberta case. 
 
First, while Water for Life aims to coordinate stakeholders beyond just water license 
holders and encourages participation from multiple sectors, these efforts are removed from direct 
regulatory influence. This implies that Water for Life must rely on the normative force of better 
arguments for policy influence. This has two consequences. First, that arguments – themselves 
developed in reference to conservation, sound science and agreeable partnerships – must be 
taken seriously by decision makers in the Alberta government. Second, actors who choose to 
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remain outside of Water for Life, perhaps because they hold substantive goods that do not 
properly reduce to the procedural norms of deliberative practices, are left in an ambiguous 
position with respect to participating in watershed management decisions that may affect them. 
For instance, First Nations who chose not to participate (i.e. for reasons related to the conditions 
of funding contracts) do not have a clear channel for communicating their concerns. On the other 
hand, there is a possibility that powerful actors may bi-pass the management structure of Water 
for Life and seek direct influence on government decision makers. 
 
Second, Alberta’s Water for Life strategy was explicitly modeled on networks and 
partnerships that emerged from civil society. Yet this context was not explicitly acknowledged in 
the discourse or design of new management institutions. This became an important issue for 
WPACs. In this regard, the funding shift from grants to contracts, coupled with the withdrawal of 
previous civil society partnerships as the result of new government relations, had the effect of 
weakening the position of civil society as WPACs came to have a dependent relationship on the 
government. In this way, the political economy of new management institutions became an 
important factor in management transitions, but this issue received no attention in the design, 
appraisal or renewal of Water for Life. This has affected both the independence of WPACs vis-à-
vis the perceived security of their funding and on the ability to incorporate knowledge from First 
Nations.  
 
4.  The procedural turn: broader lessons 
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One of the key reasons for effecting the ‘procedural turn’ has been the rejection of 
‘command and control’ resources management. And, in principle, fair procedures should ensure 
fair outcomes. In practice, however, the authority to implement decisions must back up 
procedural mechanisms. As such, procedures used to manage transitions in any particular socio-
technical system are set within a broader context – within the political – and this influences how 
procedures negotiate existing power relationships. This troubles theoretical appeals to neutrality. 
For instance, Canada’s First Nations hold unique legal standing by virtue of various treaties and 
aboriginal rights and title associated with the fact that did not cede sovereignty to the Canadian 
state. As such, the requirement for them to articulate claims through procedures backstopped by 
the authority of the Canadian state does not fit with notions of fairness that respect their rights to 
alternate systems of resource management or self-governance (Tully 1995). Interestingly, recent 
court decisions in New Zealand allow for different legal traditions to operate between indigenous 
peoples and the state, albeit in limited fashion (Strang 2014). 
 
Existing political practices compromise the claimed neutrality of the procedural turn 
since it requires those contesting existing practices to conform to the procedures set out by those 
with political power as a condition of participation. Here, Schmidt’s (2010) claim that water 
ethics are about disagreements over beliefs, states of affairs or correctly ordered social 
relationships must be expanded to include the rules governing legitimacy. At the same time, and 
to consider Hendricks (2009) deployment of ‘the political’ and ‘politics’, transitions in water 
management do not reduce to issues of power alone. The Alberta case reveals that we cannot 
universalize the ‘conflictual society’ theorized by Mouffe (2005) because, even if water 
management reforms are catalyzed by conflict, it is not the case that resolving conflict is the only 
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consideration of water management reforms. The creation of “state of the watershed” reports, for 
instance, can be seen as an effort to establish a baseline for decision making irrespective of 
political differences and even to prevent conflicts – with the caveat that this process is not free of 
choices about knowledge sources. So Hendricks’ proposal helps in understanding how transitions 
are affected by conflict but considerations might still be made for seeing transitions in 
cooperative terms.  
 
Finally, theoretical and political considerations of transition management are routinely 
referenced to the need for reflexive responses to feedback from multiple sources affecting socio-
technical systems (Meadowcroft 2009, Loorbach 2010). In normative terms, however, reflexivity 
is necessary but not sufficient. In this sense, the choice to pursue procedural governance 
techniques should be recognized as the political choice of a particular policy community (Kysar 
2010). In normative terms, then, reflexivity should be complemented with reflective judgments 
regarding policy objectives and management ends and how they issue from the norms and 
categories of particular groups. For instance, instead or alongside of Alberta’s procedural turn, 
space could have been made to revisit or expand who counts as part of the “community” in order 
to replace narrow notions of the ‘national interest’ with sensibilities tuned to ecological 
considerations and indigenous rights. Here, questions arise regarding how to organize water 
management in ways that does not require conformance to procedural norms as a condition of 
participation. And this points to the need for transition management to undertake research on 
how multiple systems of praxis can be coordinated. This is a complementary goal, but also one 
that recognizes how the ‘procedural turn’ can further entrench inequities if the existing practices 
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